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economic institutions can have ‘structures of sin’ in their architectures. The
Old Testament prophets have been interpreted either way! Using results from
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1. The Old Testament prophets
The Old Testament prophets have been a major inﬂuence on Western civilisation and now
on the Third World too. It has always been understood that, among other things which
do not concern us here, they spoke about the justice of society, a whole nation, and ﬁnally,
explicitly in Jeremiah, condemned the nation to slavery and dispersal for its injustice.
There has been a lack of understanding of the details of their message—many words are
corrupt and references indecipherable. But the main lines have been clear: they taught
that an action could be legal but unjust, that the rulers (at least) had a responsibility to
enact just laws instead of unjust ones, and that legal means could be used to defraud the
poor of what remained their rights in spite of all laws to the contrary.
1.1 Archaeological light on the prophets’ message
There has until recently been no consensus on whether the prophets spoke about a concept
of social justice, or collective responsibility, or only individualistic injustice.
1The traditional interpretation by moralists and theologians of this has been fairly
legalistic. But alongside this view, there has always been another more populist current:
the prophets were standing up to the powerful and wealthy who were oppressing the poor,
bringing about what the prophets poetically referred to as ‘the ruin of Joseph,’ by a
combination of legal but unjust measures and the usual concomitants of forgery, bribed
perjury, confusion about land titles, and breaking the laws of release and redemption. Even
atheists like Bertrand Russell and communists like Percy Shelley have taken inspiration
from this, as did the English revolutionaries and populists through the centuries and Third
World base communities today.
But on what evidence will we decide the question? Fortunately our understanding of
the socio-economic situation in which prophets such as Micah, Amos, and Jeremiah inter-
vened, has increased through archaeological research (Weinfeld, 1995). Our understanding
of their allusions and references is much more speciﬁc than it was a thousand years ago.
Philological research has shown that some phrases which used to be interpreted literally
or metaphorically, are actual technical legal phrases whose exact meaning is now known.
For example, what is usually translated as ‘mercy and justice’ means the king’s procla-
mation of amnesty, freedom for debt-slaves, and remission of debts and redistribution of
land in the direction of greater equality (return of forfeited collateral for mortgage debts)
on his accession to the throne. This throws new light on Micah’s injunction, ‘What does
the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love mercy (kindness), and to walk humbly
with your God?’ Far from being a piously vague wish, it is a programmatic demand.
So this divergence of interpretations of the prophets outlines a philosophical, social,
2and economic theme which is the topic for our investigation. Is justice a legalistic concept
or a substantive (sociological or absolute) concept? Is justice purely individualistic or is
there such a thing as social justice? Was the economics of the prophets, their condemnation
of usury and advocacy of periodic return of collateral etc., faulty? Does it still apply?
What should we say about social justice now? If there is such a thing as social justice,
does it entail collective responsibility and contradict individual responsibility or not? Is
there any way short of an axiomatic radical egalitarianism or Christianity to reach deﬁnite
conclusions about the social injustice of some institutions?
Perhaps the axiom of egalitarianism is true, but it is not proved yet. A-historical
attempts to analyse and deﬁne justice have generally remained mere assertions and ide-
ologies, and yet one more seems superﬂuous. But putting together our three ingredients
results in more than the sum of the parts: and we can, for perhaps the ﬁrst time, formu-
late a deﬁnite and general criterion of social justice. (‘Comparable Worth.’) But to begin
with, we ﬁrst delimit the ‘social’ distinction between social justice and justice, classically
individualistically conceived.
There is a separate category of social justice that does not involve the notion of
collective responsibility. It leaves individual responsibility intact. Why isn’t it reducible
to individualistic justice?
Let’s start with the prophets.
Israel from the period of the Judges until the monarchy had been more egalitarian
and self-suﬃcient. The Philistines’ superior military technology made the development of
a professional military caste, a feudal class, with a centralised leadership, the king and
3his court, necessary for independence as a nation. But it was the start of a veritable
social revolution. Army captains were given landed estates as absentee owners and the
combination of processes familiar to us today from recent Third World history created
a sharp increase in the inequality of society. Enserfment and debt peonage grew. Cash
crops for export, grown by hired hands, displaced free peasant smallholdings. The land
was relatively depopulated, cities grew, but slum sections of cities, a novelty, grew up, as
archaeological evidence proves.
The Deuteronomist was, in hindsight, severely negative about this. The original
prophets were probably ambivalent about the institution of the monarchy: independence
was a plus (especially for ethno-cultic reasons) but the impoverishment of whole classes of
people was a minus. Jeremiah eventually put the dispossession of a debtor of his family
farm (even though in legal enforcement of a mortgage contract freely and fairly entered
into), onto the short list of crimes which merited Israel’s total destruction.
This social revolution was primarily socio-economic in nature. But the socio-economic
institutions were ancient ones: some seeming modern similarities are deceptive. For exam-
ple, the notion of law was diﬀerent. Ever since Rome, the Western idea of law has been
that of a ﬁxed code which the judge simply applies (with the interpretation necessary for
the task at hand). In the Ancient Near East in general, and Ancient Israel in particular,
there was no such set of legal rules. The village elders met at the gate and decided cases
on a case-by-case basis, according to their society’s ideals, of course. Law codes as then
written were more like a hortatory utopian literary genre than something binding on a
judge. Bearing this in mind, what sounds to our ears like legalism is actually a utopian
4idealism, and the considerations which used to make some think that large parts of the
Mosaic code were quite late are refuted: equally idealistic law codes existed in the Ancient
near East a thousand years before the prophets.
A whole generation of scholarship, summarised by Prof. Moshe Weinfeld of Hevrew
University, has shown direct parallels throughout the Ancient Near East’s psalms, idealised
law codes, and messianic prophecies. (The verb) ‘judge’ even means rather ‘save’ or ‘rescue’
or ‘intervene in favour of’ rather than ‘render correct procedural legal rulings.’ Zechariah
7:vii, ix (viii is an interpolation) go ‘render true judgements, show kindness and mercy each
to his brother, do not oppress the widow, the fatherless, the sojourner, or the poor.’ The
parallelism show that ‘judge’ means the same as mercy, to rescue from oppression. Many
other passages in the Psalms and prophets have Mesopotamian and Babylonian, Ugaritic
and Hellenistic parallels. Psalm 146:vii ‘He does justice for the oppressed, he gives bread
to the hungry.’ The verse-poetic parallelism makes more sense if we see ‘judge’ as meaning
‘save or rescue.’
As Professor Weinfeld concludes about the Hebrew hendiadys, ms .pt tsdqh (usually
translated misleadingly and over-literally as ‘justice and righteousness’), ‘the concept refers
primarily to the improvement of the conditions of the poor.’ (p. 35) ‘The term implicitly
refers to kindness and mercy as well ... and the word ms .pt in this word-pair should not
be understood in the juridical sense.’ Indeed, its original Ugaritic meaning was connected
with administration, rather than judiciating, and only later did it acquire a speciﬁcally
juridical sense as well (p. 40). Seeligmann, an earlier linguist, also saw that the original
meaning of s .pt was rescue.
5Justice and righteousness is a synonym for mercy and kindness, and only later did the
meaning of mercy and kindness dwindle away into the modern connotations of philanthropy
and charity. Once one is aware of this linguistic history, many parallelisms become more
intelligible, and the pattern they exhibit becomes signiﬁcant instead of vapoury: Ps 33:v,
89:xv; Jer 9:xxiii; Hos 2:xxi, 12:vii; Mic 6:viii.
In Proverbs 20:xxviii a throne is said to be maintained with h .sd, kindness, and in
proverbs 25:v (and also 16:xii) with righteousness: tsdq —showing they are, in origin,
synonyms. Too, the Mesopotamian cognates kittum misarum clearly has the meaning
‘the establishment of social equity, i.e., improving the status of the poor and the weak in
society through a series of regulations which prevent oppression.’ The Rosetta Stone is a
proclamation of amnesty, debt relief, and forgiveness of tax arrears.
The regulations in Israel which would have slowed or interfered with the social rev-
olution were the Sabbath year and Jubilee year regulations—parallel regulations are at-
tested to in Mesopotamia long before Moses. But this violates the individual freedom
to contract. The prohibition on usury and land accumulation (except in cities and to
foreigners=merchants) also has been a theme of the prophets.
Were the prophets romanticising the pastoral economy and being reactionaries against
progress? Adam Smith deliberately attacked them on both points.
The answer is to see them as making a critique of institutions, not of justice or laws
legalistically or individualistically deﬁned.
1.2 Sociological light on the same
I want to argue that the intention of the prophets was to criticise and condemn institutions.
6The Holy Father’s idea of structures of sin can be found in an incoherent form in the
prophets. But to see it there we need a passing acquaintance with the fundamentals of
modern sociological theory: what is an institution? Although many details in this are
contentious, we only need the basic outline, which is practically a consensus by now of
American theoretical sociologists and is based on the parts of the work of Talcott Parsons,
Neil Smelser, and Mark Gould which are not seriously disputed.
When we understand the modern theory of an institution, it sheds new light on what
the prophets were saying and makes larger patterns apparent which were unintelligible
previously. (For example, the waﬄing they exhibit on individual responsibility versus
collective responsibility.) It allows us to deﬁne precisely what we mean by social.
The sociological point of view is opposed to the legalistic point of view, and is a
valuable supplement to the economist’s point of view or the moralist’s point of view:
To anticipate, only individuals exist and act, BUT some patterns in their actions are
unintelligible in individualistic terms alone. ‘Social’ is an adjective we use when that
happens.
The sociological point of view looks at what people are actually doing and how they
actually classify and evaluate their actions in terms of expectations or ‘folk-morality’,
rather than how they may be legally classiﬁed. For example, legally, our Constitution
says who is and who is not ‘part of the government.’ But sociology looks to the substance
of governing. Anyone performing governing functions is part of the sociologically deﬁned
institutions of government, of the ‘polity,’ to use the technical term. Bank loan oﬃcers
and bond investors are exercising the functions of government because they direct the ﬂow
7of the allocation of the resources of society to some projects and away from others. (This
is the highest layer in the cybernetic hierarchy: the function of goal-attainment, and is the
function of the polity.)
The abstract deﬁnition of an institution is that it is an interlocking complex of roles,
expectations, and sanctions (norms) which is institutionalised in a particular society. A
role is like a script but is more ﬂexible, certainly much more ﬂexible than a rule. Husband
is a role, so is doctor, patient, employer, employee, debtor, creditor, teacher, student,
peon, contractor, and so on. These roles do not envelop the whole person but when the
person is acting within the role, with another person in a corresponding role, there is a
restriction on what they will do. Not as restrictive as a theatrical script, but restrictive in
the beneﬁcial sense of reducing the number of conscious choices they have to make each
second. Example of doctor and patient. Lecturing versus conversing. There is a structure
of mutual expectations and sanctions—both rewards and negative sanctions.
An institution, such as medicine, is a complex of interacting roles which are institu-
tionalised in the sense that enough of the actors have internalised, accept as legitimate,
enough of their roles so that the interaction functions eﬀectively: the rewards which are
available for distribution are enough for the purpose, so are the punishments. These re-
wards may be partly material, from the economic aspect of society, and partly aﬀectional
or psychological. The roles aren’t institutionalised unless their interlocking complex ﬁts
into the larger society, where other institutions produce the rewards and punishments for
distribution, etc. This is mostly about stable situations.
Of course institutions change, some dwindle and disappear. Marriage today is very
8diﬀerent than sixty years ago. Probably because of the decline in real wages: pressure
from other institutions meant the old roles would no longer meet people’s needs etc. Such
strain generates deviance on the part of individuals but also constructive change on the
part of institutions. Employment has changed.
An institution, or a role for that matter, is merely an analytical category we use to
analyse patterns of individual behaviour. If we use these categories we see more patterns
than if we don’t: behavioural regularities which were unintelligible without them become
intelligible. Like a philologist’s discovery of the ‘meaning’ of a word, the sociological
categories help us see the meaning of an individual action.
In Ancient Israel or other ancient societies the types of contracts which were recognised
as valid, i.e., institutionalised, were very few and very rigid. But one of them, usury or
mortgage, was vastly diﬀerent than today even if the legalities overlap quite a bit. Legally
or philosophically, it looks like a simple contract, a free relationship entered into by two
equal individuals: the local village magnate, moneylender, usually with a band of thugs at
his disposal, enters into an equal bargain with a small freeholder who due to a bad harvest
has to borrow at 200% or 1000% in order to make it to the next harvest. Collateral is
the land, wife, and children. The real object on the part of the magnate is to get hold
of the land—he hopes for foreclosure. Upon failure to repay, either the peasants will be
evacuated or allowed to stay on as debt-peons—a kind of serfdom allowed by suﬀrance of
the landlord but not legally recognised.
In the abstract legal point of view, almost all of this, except the slavery part, is formally
the same as modern mortgages. But it is a diﬀerent institution from the sociological point
9of view because of the diﬀerence in roles. Legalism does not take cognisance of this and so
cannot see a pattern in ‘the ruin of Joseph’ which the prophets saw.
Two mortgage contracts can be identical legally but belong to two diﬀerent institu-
tions. A commercial lender and a powerful investor have diﬀerent roles than a peasant
freeholder and the local village moneybags. Therefore the contracts belong to diﬀerent
institutions. This enables us to ﬁlter out the ‘noise’ of coalescing two diﬀerent phenomena
under the same rubric, and enables us to see that the social revolution under the monar-
chy, just as globalisation under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund today, form
one pattern, because of the power relations aﬀecting the roles, while the relation between
bond investors and corporate borrowers is entirely diﬀerent. The former was caused by
an institution the prophets called usury, while the second needs a modern moral analysis,
and has to be kept separate. In particular, attempts to argue via a reductio ad absurdum
against the prophets’ critique, by pointing to the folly of applying it to the relations in the
modern market between bond investors and corporate borrowers, must be seen as a straw
man. Hence they fail to shelter the globalisation policies from the prophetic denunciation
of the social injustice of the usurious developments under the monarchy.
The prophets are apparently inconsistent on this issue of individual responsibility and
collective responsibility. I claim this is evidence of the intent to commit an institutional
critique.
The institutional interpretation of the prophets solves various seeming contradictions
which occur in the same person’s speech. Jeremiah says all have sinned, yet he later points
out that he has never been guilty. In fact Jeremiah preached a defeatist policy because he
10saw in advance what would in fact happen after defeat: the urban elite and exploiters were
enslaved or exiled and the occupiers redistributed the land to the poor and needy Israelites,
who were thus better oﬀ. He stayed behind with the poor. So after all the prophecies of
universal punishment and destruction, we see him perfectly aware that the poor would be
rewarded in the aftermath of defeat and the punishment would fall diﬀerentially, primarily
on the leaders of society who had failed to do tsdq and hsd.
DEFINITION 1: Social justice is when the justice or injustice of an individual’s act is
unintelligible except by means of an institutional analysis, taking economics into account
as well.
Institutions do not really act or sin, only individuals do. But the injustice of an
individual’s individual action might depend on the way it interacts with the existing insti-
tutions, including economic institutions.
Institutions are created by individual acts. They require routine maintenance: ap-
plying sanctions to people who obey the norms or violate the norms. They also require
occasional adjustments. Criteria for when an institution is socially unjust are needed for
the carrying out of such institutional analyses as are mentioned above in the deﬁnition;
just as criteria for when an action is individualistically unjust are needed for the classical
moral theological analyses of individualistically conceived justice.
(We will later oﬀer a conjecture as to such an general, abstract, criterion.)
If an institution is judged to be unjust, then only those individuals who create or
maintain it are guilty. Not everyone who participates in it. This is the labour theory of
value applied to capital: institutions are the capital goods of a culture. (Rival theories of
11their valuation were refuted during the Capital Controversy, described below.)
The prophets evidently taught or more or less implicitly applied to their situation at
least one criterion, the same as in the U.S. Bishops’ Pastoral Letter on the U.S. Economy.
Those institutions which lead to a worsening in the relative position of the poorest and
powerless are socially unjust, as are those which increasingly exclude those sectors from
active participation, including decision-making, in all aspects of society, including economic
ones (National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1986, p. 92).
In my opinion this one criterion is enough to decide many of the urgent questions of
the day, such as the enormous diﬀerential, nearly 2-1, in the appreciation of capital assets
compared to the increase in minimum hourly wages over the last generation, such as the
diﬀerential impacts of globalisation on Third World elites compared to peasants, et hoc
genus omne.
The duty of the polity, according to the prophets, is to rescue the oppressed from
their oppressors, and the foreclosure on mortgages is their prime example of oppression.
Social justice requires debt relief and land reform. This applies almost word for word to
the Third World of the last ﬁfty years, but also applies, more indirectly perhaps, to the
developments in the First World.
2. The Crisis in Economic Theory
Beginning with Adam Smith, free-market ideologues have attacked the prophets as ro-
manticists with a misguided diagnosis of society’s ills. They have developed an economic
orthodoxy which argues that the progress of society (or even its current eﬃciency) depends
on the enforcement of such contracts without inquiring into their substantive fairness, and
12that because of economic growth, the peasants themselves or at least their descendants
will be better oﬀ for such evictions.
(Orthodox growth theory is not in agreement with the data (Scott, 1989, pp. 96, 138),
and its theoretical foundations were shaken in the 1950’s by Joan Robinson (1953) and
Piero Sraﬀa, as we are about to discuss.)
Is power or inequality in economic condition a crucial factor, even when hidden under
formal procedural equality, or are free market theorists right to assert on the contrary that
these results were due to the absence of fully competitive money markets and the harsh
realities of famine and the lower productivity of traditional peasant agriculture compared
to the progressive techniques and economies of scale introduced by the feudal landlords
on their latifundia as they cleared the ground of peasants? Israel’s economic and military
power ﬂourished in parallel with ‘the ruin of Joseph.’
Free-market theory denies the prophets’ diagnosis of the ills of Israel and denies that
power aﬀects the outcomes of freely entered into contracts as long as the procedural equality
of free markets and the rule of law is guaranteed. (The fact is, this theory simply and
absolutely denies the existence of economic power.)
Adam Smith, who strenuously disagreed with the prophets’ analysis of what was wrong
with the economic policies of the monarchy, attempted to sketch the (future) development
of a vast free-market theory which would show how individual wishes and actions, indi-
vidualistically conceived, would be harmonised by the action of a minimally-institutional,
minimally-social market mechanism into a just result. Thus social justice would be reduced
to two ingredients only: individual justice, i.e., absence of fraud and procedural inequality,
13and the correct implementation of the institutions of the free market. (‘Unchaining private
initiative.’) This ideological project received its profoundest check at the hands of Joan
Robinson and her co-thinkers at Cambridge in the ‘50’s, in the so-called Capital Contro-
versy. She showed that the free market could not valuate capital goods. Therefore market
mechanisms could not, even in theory, balance the competing trade-oﬀs between growth
and current consumption. The rate of proﬁt, or interest, was sociologically determined
and could not be reduced to individualistically conceived supply functions and demand
functions. Capital is not a thing, not a commodity or economic factor of production, it is
a social relation. Consensus, opinion, politics, and power, enters into the determination of
the rate of proﬁt even in theory. It was pointed out, although it has been since contested,
of course, that the usual modes of free-market analysis are insuﬃcient to determine the
rates of proﬁt or growth (because inter-temporal trade-oﬀs being subject to the Kakutani
counter-example. . .1 ) Ideologues had relied on this analysis in order to deny, with
Samuelson, that the sociological concept of power was needed in the economic analysis of
proﬁt. Robinson correctly concluded that it was not possible even in theory, even in the
theoretical utopia of a completely free market, for economic factors alone to determine the
rate of proﬁt, power relations had always to be analysed.
The Capital Controversy arose between Post-Keynesians at Cambridge University
(Sraﬀa, a communist proteg´ e of Keynes’s, and Robinson) on the one hand, and orthodox
individualistic utility theorists at M.I.T., on the other, about growth theory to begin with.
Ignoring its roots in technicalities of growth theory, it transpired that there was a logical
1 ‘However, if agents are uncertain about other agents’ behaviour, so that strategic
reasoning intrudes, no equilibrium may exist even with complete futures markets. This
problem is severe.’ (Weintraub, 1979, p. 92)
14circularity in the orthodox theory of ‘capital’ as a factor of production symmetric and
equal to labour. The same physical capital goods would count as diﬀerent quantities of
ﬁnancial capital depending on the amount of inequality in society. This is unintelligible
from an individualistic utilitarian standpoint, it should be the other way around: the
physical qualities of capital goods in society ought, in orthodox theology, to explain the
inequality in society *via* the ﬁnancial requirements to ‘capitalise’ it at its true value (a
value to be determined by marginal utility theory and marginal productivity theory, which
are totally individualistic theories, as in Walras).
The M.I.T. side sought refuge in more and more elaborate mathematical models of
individual choices. (This authour is from the M.I.T. mathematics department, where we
use Walras’s collected works to prop up an uneven table leg.) As projected by Walras,
the rate of proﬁt was supposed to be determined by a theory of individual choices be-
tween consuming now versus investing instead (in order to consume more later) (so-called,
inter-temporal preferences). Nevertheless, the basic logical circularity always remained.
(Equally nevertheless, both sides claimed victory.) Capital, in its guise as a deﬁnite quan-
tity of ﬁnance, is a socially constructed phenomenon, not reducible to either the physics
of the machines, and/or an individualistic calculus of utilities and preferences.1
The Cambridge side concluded2 that after all, the only way to avoid a circularity
1 ‘The mechanism of self-regulation of the market does not work ... It is deeply disap-
pointing particularly for the authour that he has to complete this volume with the ﬁnal
section of the Addendum which establishes a theorem that no general equilibrium of full
employment is possible unless the equalisation of rates of proﬁts between capital goods is
ruled out. I call this thesis the “dilemma of durable goods” ... [because of this] Walras’s
weak point [is] that the true demand functions of new capital goods are absent [from the
model].’ (Morishima, 1996, p. 285f.)
2 A neutral agreed: Morishima (1973, p. 102f.)
15of deﬁnition was to use the labour theory of value (or something similar) to value capital
assets. This would not be identical with their prices, but only for the same reason that
underlying values are not the exact reﬂection of market prices. Values would be more useful
for macroeconomic growth models than market prices would be. Even though less useful
for training future stock brokers in business school. Proﬁt, in particular, was not derivable
from economic factors alone, it was simply the residual left from production after wages
were paid. The relative shares of wages and proﬁts were determined by non-economic
factors, such as power struggles.
The inadequacy of the ‘free-ness’ of the market, the reliance on power, to govern the
economy, parallels the inadequacy of procedural regularity (which is the same thing as
the ‘free-ness’ of the market under another name) to perform all the philosophical-ethical
functions of substantive fairness.
Orthodoxy, therefore, quickly lost interest in the Capital Controversy: even though
Samuelson’s college text on Economics had to make some reference to it in the 10th edi-
tion, this reference was excised as soon as possible, and is no longer present. Economics
departments which have refused to conform have been punished by provosts, for example,
by being split into two, and the oﬀspring diﬀerentially favoured.
It also cost Robinson her Nobel Prize—she was nominated for her much earlier work
from the ‘30’s.
(American sociological theory also lost interest in its greatest theoretical achievements.
Although Parsons was not himself a leftist, the truth about the speciﬁcity and condition-
ality of institutions, was too much truth to bear. Study the ‘free market’ as a conditioned
16institution? Instead of as an article of faith? It suggested to others uncomfortable ques-
tions. The discipline took other directions after 1978, and we all got stuck with Habermas
instead;)
Amartya Sen followed this up with empirical conﬁrmation that the so-called capital
reswitching, i.e., the dependence of the valuation of capital goods on the degree of inequality
in society (which is obviously a macro-economic, or social, variable), was crucially operating
in the development of the Great Bengal Famine of ‘43. That is, the famine, which killed
more than three million people, developed in spite of an economic boom and an increase
in the supply of rice as a result of improved harvests (Sen, 1981, pp. 75-80). The reason is
because the boom’s beneﬁts were unequally distributed. Although all classes beneﬁtted,
they did not beneﬁt equally and the degree of inequality increased. This led to instability in
the market valuation of rice-stocks, an important capital good. This instability, ampliﬁed
by speculation, created a famine in the midst of plenty in precisely the way predicted by
Robinson’s theoretical critique of the free-market mechanisms’ inability to valuate capital
goods in a smooth way. The practical conclusion is that growth with inequality can
be extremely dangerous, and this analysis shelters the Old Testament prophets, in their
critique of the policies of the monarchy, from the attempted attacks by Adam Smith and
other free-market ideologues.
This begins to address one of the most contested issues in social justice in America
today. Is improving the absolute standard of living of the poorest the relevant quantity,
or is the relative standard of living the more important quantity? It would seem that the
relative standard, however desirable it may to consider improving it, would not be relevant
to justice. But this analysis shows, at least, that its relevance to justice, while unintelligible
17from the individualistic standpoint, can become intelligible when its relationship to capital
valuation and macro-economic shifts in parameters is analysed in an institutional fashion.
(In fact, the whole signiﬁcance of ‘standard of living’ depends not only on the individualistic
micro-economic quantities which constitute the wage bargain, but equally on the macro-
economic shifts which occur as a result of large classes of such wage-bargains being made.)
Again, Robinson’s contention that political and social power is decisive in the deter-
mination of the rate of proﬁt, as a residual, is directly opposed to the orthodox view that
micro-economic fundamentals are decisive. If power has to be conceptualised in order to
theorise about economic questions, then economic theory is not fully autonomous and must
be sociologically reconstructed. If two individual events which, analysed in micro-terms
or other purely individualistic terms, have substantively diﬀerent social contents because
one was the result of a disparity in power and the other was not, then one might be unjust
even when freely and fairly arrived at, while the other might not. Thus their injustice or
lack of it would be unintelligible without the use of the concept of power to analyse it.
This is hardly reducible to analyses of market structure! For the genesis and maintenance
of power transcend the market.
The sociological reconstruction of economic theory that is necessitated by these con-
siderations, and others (Parsons and Smelser, 1956), means not only the destruction of
free-market orthodoxy as an ideology, but the opening up of room for the ‘social’ in social
justice. This reconstruction is still in progress, but enough empirical work has been done,
in a piecemeal fashion, to show that ‘trickle-down’ theories of Third World development
are not only unjust, but dangerous.
183. The ‘social’ of justice
3.1 Philosophy has not deﬁned social justice
Philosophers have always deﬁned justice in individualistic terms, for example, giving each
person their due.1 If Justice is a virtue and its study is a branch of ethics, it would be un-
deniable that only individuals are morally responsible actors. A collectivity or government
‘takes action’ in a sort of analogous sense to the way an individual does, but not the same
sense. The actions of a society might be good or bad in a transferred sense from the way
the actions of a real person can be good or bad, but not the same sense.
Philosophers have been reluctant to go even further and talk of the moral nature
of a society or corporation, and understandably so. We usually talk about the moral
responsibility of the individual in the society. A society is not an actor in the same kind
of conscious, moral way most classical philosophers and most people have thought real
individual people are.
Many, even most, philosophers have gone on to nearly deny that ‘social justice’ exists
as a category. Yet most people through the ages, most populists certainly, have thought
that there was. The Old Testament prophets were in tune with this tradition, and the
populist tradition has cherished their memory as inspired individuals who spoke truth to
power, protesting against social injustice in Ancient Israel even when it was legal.
3.2 The social dimension
Can we now give a philosophically unexceptionable grounding to some sort of deﬁnition of
social justice (even if it turns out later to be slightly inaccurate?) If there is, is it necessary
to adopt some sort of collective responsibility?
1 (Brunner, 1945, p. 17f): valuable, but lacks a deﬁnition of social justice.
19Modern American sociological theory allows us to distinguish analytically between
the indivdualistic aspects of individuals’ actions and the social aspects of their actions.
Most of an individual’s conscious acts are undertaken within an institution. In fact, the
institutional roles one individual might act within, in the course of one day, are multiple
and cross-cutting. And intertwined. An ethicist could hardly dare let them oﬀ the hook
for that reason! (Most sociologists have cared little about philosophical ethics.)
Here is an example, perhaps not very concrete. Two individuals, say an employer and
an employee, enter into a contract freely with no force, threats, guile, or fraud. In purely
individualistic terms, it is diﬃcult or impossible to see how this could be unjust. Yet it
could be a social injustice that the terms of the contract were the usual and customary or
prevailing terms. And then the agreement would indeed be unjust. Perhaps the wage-rate
agreed on is not a living wage even though the job is a full-time one. Perhaps although
it supports life, it (or other conditions of employment) violates human dignity. Perhaps
although neither of these is true, it is not equal compensation as is usually agreed on in
another sector of the economy which, although diﬀerent, is really comparable work.
Right now it is hotly contested whether such an example can really exist (barring
exceptional or extreme cases such as slavery or racial discrimination).
Two current philosophies have refused to agree to an institutional analysis. Classical
(Western) philosophy and that Anglo-American rebellion from it, utilitarianism. Classical
philosophy agrees that such a contract could be unjust, but not for the social reasons
stated. Aristotle and the Church traditions would say that each good has a just price, and
to agree to a contract seriously divergent would be an injustice. The fact that the balance
20of power between employers and employees has led to a prevailing wage rate of x would
be an injustice if x is not fair. If x is not the natural just price for the quality of labour
contracted for.
Free-market theorists, or, ideologues (who are a species of utilitarians) dissent from
this. No such contract can ever be unjust, because ‘just’ has no other meaning than pro-
cedurally regular. I.e., the regular procedure of arriving at an agreement was followed, no
threats, coercion, or fraud. Each party was free (in a formal individualistic and procedural
sense of freedom) to walk away from the negotiations.
This view is a direct oﬀspring of the utilitarian view of justice or ‘the good’ which
was meant to replace Aristotle (as he was understood at Oxford in 1776) in ethics. But
it would be fairer to say that the utilitarian (and free-market ideologues’) position is that
there is no such thing as justice. Certainly classical philosophy already had a word for
utility, ‘the useful,’ and the idea of justice was as something which could be the opposite
of useful. Pereat Mundi, ﬁat justitia! was a proverb (Bentham, 1789, p. 8ﬀ). The point
of the utilitarian rebellion in philosophy was to rule out of court a great number of the
diﬃculties in ethical considerations, those which arose from clashes between competing
goods or between the just and the expedient, by abolishing one of the terms. Justice. To
attempt to hijack this term justice (as a synonym for fairness) for use in describing formal
procedural regularity was an attempt to harness populist emotions in the service of this
very un-populist project.
(Rights-based analyses of social justice are an attempt to adapt to the utilitarian
framework and need not detain us since they do not even try to formulate a uniform
21deﬁnition of justice at a comparable level of abstraction to classical philosophy and have
run into trouble trying to ﬁt contextually-dependent forms of oppression into universalistic
rights language frameworks, as was only to be expected by conceding too much to the
utilitarians (pace Miller, 1999, pp. 221f., 232). Trying to translate substantive social justice
concerns into the language of ‘rights’ is more than a little like privatising the commons.)
(The concept of equality of opportunity is an attempt to mutilate substantive concerns
about social justice to make them ﬁt into individualistic categories. The same could be
said about ‘equal rights, equal capacities’, or even equal results. The branch of economics
known as ‘social choice theory’ has nothing social about it at all, it is grounded on the
denial of the social as a valid category, and is an attempt to hijack populist language.)
The main target of the prophets’ social criticism was not in the least procedural
irregularities in mortgage contracts between peasant land-owners and village or urban
magnates, but rather was directed against the enforcement of the contracts at all. Their
point was the contracts were unfair even if fairly and freely agreed to.
3.3 The irreducibility of the macro to the micro
Consider that employment contract again. What about the ‘walking away from it’ deﬁni-
tion of freedom? Populism, even common sense, is quick to point out that the law, with
its procedural regularity, allows the employer with access to ﬁnance, or even cash, burning
a hole in his pocket, to walk away, equally as it allows the labourer in a hand to mouth
existence to majestically walk away in search of other opportunities. Is this allowance
really freedom? Only in times of full employment is this ‘substantive freedom’ as opposed
to merely ‘formal freedom.’ Therefore ideologues have been at pains to neutralise this
22objection. The equilibrium theory of the rate of proﬁt aims to prove that unless there are
un-free-nesses in the market, we will always be in a state of full employment (Grandmont,
1983, p. 1). Thus any disadvantage the worker feels in ‘walking away’ is not the fault of
the theory of justice, but is the fault of the failure to implement the free market ideal. I.e.,
the very deﬁnition of justice has been reduced to the condition that the market be free.
The absence of friction is declared to be the absence of injustice.
It may be enough for the genuinely scientiﬁc economist to see that such an ideal
is irrelevant to any scientiﬁc description of the actual economy (Robinson, 1975, p. 94;
Grandmont, 1983, p. 6). But for a philosophical analysis of the concept of social justice we
need more. We need to know what is wrong with the economic theory of the ideal even on
its own terms. And this was provided by the Capital Controversy of Robinson and Sraﬀa
vs. Samuelson and Solow.
The world is, so far, unjust, but philosophers want to study justice anyway.
But the Capital Controversy did indeed centre on the purely logical point of whether
even the free-market ideal of rational individuals with perfect foresight of all future market
trends could valuate capital goods consistently. It addressed this ideal possibility in order
to shoot it down but hard. It is theoretically impossible that inter-temporal equilibrium
should depend on individualistic economic factors. Sociological features of institutions,
e.g., power relations in employment or in ﬁnance, must be used.
In general, ‘the social’ is when the intelligibility of an individual action cannot be
explained in individualistic terms alone but requires an institutional analysis. Most actions
will have both an individualistic dimension and a social dimension.
23Sociologists in the twentieth century discovered—now we are going to state this dis-
covery in terms of Talcott Parsons’s formulation of it—that the amount (and kind) of
conformity to social institutions was much larger (and of a diﬀerent nature) than could be
accounted for in terms of purely opportunistic calculations (calculations of the probability
of being rewarded for such conformity or punished for deviance) (Parsons, 1951). Individ-
uals are rational but not rational in a merely opportunistic utilitarian sense and there are
profound reasons why societies will be more stable, and functional when this is so. (At
any rate, it is an observed fact.)
Economic theory when properly formulated and understood has in its own terms a
precise parallel to this. Only the ideologues believe that they have reduced macro-economic
theory to micro-economic categories. Keynesians (Davidson, 1972) and others (Bhaduri,
1993, p. 134) such as institutionalists (such as Martin Shubik (1975) the pioneer of game
theory within economics) have noticed that this cannot be done.
But do the sum total of these many individual exchanges really explain the aggregate
level of society’s oﬀerings (production) or consumption? Is the aggregate level of employ-
ment really intelligible as the sum of eighty million individual decisions to work or refuse
to work? Is the aggregate level of output of production really the result of consumers’
decisions?
The idea that monetary theory makes the determination of these aggregate levels
intelligible in a way that a theory of barter does not, pre-dates Keynes. Even pre-Keynesian
macroeconomic theory (Keynes, 1930) relied on additional categories in order to make these
aggregate levels analytically intelligible. (Keynesianism (Keynes, 1936) went further still.
24For example, there could exist unemployment equilibria (Dr` eze, 1991).)
Money is, of course, an institution not reducible to the free market.1 So within eco-
nomic theory itself we already see the paradigm of ‘the social’: that which is unintelligible
when analysed strictly individualistically, in this case the aggregate level of output, be-
comes intelligible within the framework of an institutional analysis.
(Actually, Parsons was very inﬂuenced by Keynes in the details of his theory of institu-
tions and the ‘generalised media of exchange’ (or communication) such as power, inﬂuence,
and legitimation which alongside of money he proposed played a role in the functioning of
society and the interactions between institutions.)
Now consider what economic theory (as opposed to ideology) has, then, to say about
our original example. The employment contract. The individual bargain takes place
within the given level of aggregate demand (relevant for the employer, in motivating their
animal spirits) and given level of aggregate employment. (And not vice versa.) (Not the
individual decisions which all harmonise to produce the aggregate levels.) (Not consciously
in a way that the actors perceive and factor into their moral decisions, it is not on the
moral radar.) For the rational individual, these are given. There is no discernible injustice,
individualistically conceived, in the free agreement both sides reach, each with one eye on
their motivating level.
But the aggregate levels determined whether this was a digniﬁed, participatory wage
or not. Etc. And it was the operations of the monetary institutions in addition to the
1 Hahn: ‘To the pure theorist, at the present juncture the most interesting and chal-
lenging aspect of money is that it can ﬁnd no place in an Arrow–Debreu economy.’ (1987,
p. 21f). Also de Cecco and Fitoussi (1987, p. 3): ‘There cannot be a microeconomic jus-
tiﬁcation of money. Money is, in its essence, a macrophenomenon, which needs a macro-
foundation, to be derived from the institutional world.’
25‘real factors’ which determined those levels. Now it is usually admitted that the real
factors are force majeure, the rain falls on the just and the unjust alike. Hence the free
market ideology, postulating that real factors alone determine the aggregate levels, denying
the need for the analytical category of monetary institutions, concludes that there is no
other moral carrier for the justice or injustice of the agreement than the procedures of the
two parties. But economic theory identiﬁes the behaviour of the monetary institutions
(at least) as another input, and the social input. Thus there is both an individualistic
dimension and a social dimension.
The more extreme example that concerned the prophets (and is still relevant to the
Third World (Bhaduri, 1993, p. 222)): a peasant landholder, facing starvation, would
seek recourse in a loan from the local magnate (or agent of an urban feudal noble), as
we discussed concretely. This was a legal contract freely entered into. The prophets
condemned its enforcement, and considered the state’s enforcement of these contracts as
an abdication of the state’s duty to rescue the poor from oppression. This abdication was
put on their short list of the crimes which merited the total destruction of Israel.
But the Capital Controversy showed that economic theory needs to take into account
power relations. The peasant and the magnate have an immense disparity in power. On
the other hand, an urban investor and a mercantile enterprise (in Ancient Israel, the
word foreigner was synonymous for merchant) do not. Although from a formal, legal, and
individualistic viewpoint a loan to a peasant from a magnate and a loan to a merchant
from an investor are identical, they are so disparate from a sociological, institutional, and
correctly theorised economic standpoint, that they should not even be given the same
26title. (And this dichotomy was recognised by the Deuteronomists: usury was forbidden by
them in the former case, but allowed in the latter. The Jubilee regulations make urban
property permanently alienable, but require the re-distribution of peasant property back
to the expropriated.)
We have seen that the attack on the prophets by economic orthodoxy and free-market
ideology fails even for purely logical reasons, we need not appeal to those useful shortcuts,
scientiﬁc insight or historical realism. In particular, the utilitarian arguments in favour of
the utility of these contracts is fallacious. Therefore we have to come to terms with their
assertion that the enforcement of these contracts was unjust.
4. The deﬁnition of social justice
Can we now deﬁne what institutions are socially unjust? Firstly, not all failures to be
good are injustices, so we cannot answer this question by painting a picture of ‘the good
society.’ (Equality, liberty, and fraternity are no doubt goods, but not the same good as
justice.)
4.1 Economic social justice
If we operate by analogy with the classical deﬁnition of individualistic justice, which is
that of equal exchange, we conjecture the following:
DEFINITION 2: An economic institution is socially unjust if it arranges that individ-
uals freely exchange unequal values in comparable situations. Usually this disarrangement
will be due to aﬀecting macro-levels of the parameters.
Philosophy takes data points from common practices or linguistic usages. The populist
ratiﬁcation of the Old Testament prophets’ testimony must, then, be either explained or
27at least explained away. A philosophical commitment, such as utilitarianism, which relies
on fallacious economics in order to disregard obvious sociological facts and contradict this
populist ratiﬁcation cannot, then, be correct. Does our conjecture fare any better?
Contract is not a timeless absolute, diﬀerent societies have diﬀerent institutions of
contract. In fact, the same society can have two substantively diﬀerent institutions of
contract, which are legally indistinguishable but sociologically distinguishable. Their sub-
stantive fairness can, therefore, diﬀer even if the procedural regularity criterion of fairness
cannot distinguish between them.
The duty of the polity, according to the prophets, is to rescue the oppressed from their
oppressors, and the foreclosure on mortgages is their prime example of oppression. Social
justice requires debt relief and land reform.
Our proferred abstract deﬁnition justiﬁes this empirical insight. Even though the
mortgate contract, in the presence of the disparity in power, is freely agreed to, and even
though in an individual utilitarian sense the peasant prefers to obtain one more year of
freedom before becoming enslaved, rather than starve immediately, it is the disparity in
power, institutionalised in the contract, that arranges the unfavourable terms of the loan.
Not the objective values of the products exchanged. This is a case of extreme divergence
of value from price. The divergence is partly produced by the climatic emergency, but it is
ampliﬁed by institutional arrangements. Sen’s analysis of the Great Bengal Famine of 1943
showed that instabilities in the valuation of the main capital good, rice (Ricardo would
have called it corn), related to reswitching, made possible the extreme divergence between
value and price that eroded the entitlements to food earned by the poorest labourers.
28This is another example of institutional arrangements amplifying or even producing a
catastrophic injustice. (For in the case of the Great Bengal Famine, there was no decrease
in absolute food stocks. The extremity of the erosion of entitlements was the product of
institutional arrangements.) Sen’s empirical study is the most important example of the
practical importance of the Capital Controversy that has been published.
Returning to the case of employment we are then asserting, with Smith and Ricardo,
the labour theory of value, in order to have a standard of ‘comparable worth.’ (In principle,
any scientiﬁcally correct economic theory of value would do. But, at least at present, there
is no rival candidate. The theory of utility crashed and burned in the Capital Controversy.)
The skills of an entrepreneur at guessing market demand, at organising production, and
the willingness to bear risk deserve compensation equal to that of comparable workers
in diﬀerent situations. Obviously it is institutional structures which interfere with this
equality, not ‘real factors.’
The Capital Controversy showed that the will-o’-the-wisp of a supply a demand curve
for Capital as if it were a factor of production is incoherent at the level of theory (Harcourt,
1972). So the question of a just reward to Capital need not detain us, the question is simply
nonsensical. Capital is not a factor of production, it is a social relation, an institution. The
institution, including its rules for rewards, is just to the extent to which it manipulates
aggregate levels so that etc., etc. (this is not more circular than the economy itself). It
would seem, perhaps, that if capitalists as a class enjoy more power and goods on average,
then it is unjust, but perhaps (this is not easily ruled out a priori but perhaps it could be
ruled out in other ways) otherwise, capital as an institution could be conceivably just.
29Robinson and Sraﬀa showed that only the labour theory of value could provide a
valuation of capital goods at the aggregate level.1 (The Kakutani counter-example suggests
even worse....) Parsonian theory then needs a Post-Keynesian emendation. Institutions are
the capital goods of the social structure as a going concern. They require to be constructed,
maintained, and adapted. Individuals contribute to this—in fact, no institution is anything
other than the stored labour of past individuals. The moral responsibility of individuals
for social injustices consists then in these individual acts of creation, maintenance, and
adaptation. This makes clear the relation between the individual and the social and the
mediated nature of individual responsibility for social injustices. To assert that there was
collective responsibility would be parallel to saying Capital was a Factor of Production
entitled to a factor return.
4.2 Non-economic social justice and macro-sociology
There are other exchanges besides economic values. Due regard. Due respect.
Aren’t these exchanges analogous to economic exchanges?
If correct are Talcott Parsons’s more detailed theories about the ways in which diﬀerent
institutions, including non-economic ones, interact with each other, then we can generalise
these considerations and formulate abstract general philosophical criteria for when an
institution is socially unjust, even when it is not an economic institution. Parsons proposed
that e.g., power was a credit phenomenon, backed by force, analogously to the way money
is backed by gold or some other purchasing power standard. Hence capable of inﬂation and
deﬂation, and having similar eﬀects on social growth as does the price-level on economic
growth.
1 Robinson, as quoted in Pasinetti (1981, p. 179)
30Parsons’s work seems to establish, and there is empirical (Gould, 1987, pp. 16-57)
support for it, that each of the four major sub-sectors of society as a whole, the economy,
the polity, the integrative, and the latency sub-system, possesses a generalised medium
of exchange which is credit-based and is interchanged between institutions. Part of the
interaction between institutions consists of exchanges of these media. In the more advanced
societies, each medium comes under the control of a kind of symbolic maintenance system
analogous to what the banking system is within the economy. For the economy, money,
which is created by a banking-ﬁduciary system and is ‘backed’ by gold, classically (or
purchasing power, currently). For the polity, the standard of value is power, which is
‘backed’ by force. But just as in a healthy functioning economy, there is much more money
than the amount of ‘backing,’ so in a legitimate government, the amount of conformity
people pay to it, due to its power, is much larger than the naked force it commands to
‘back’ up that power. Inﬂuence is, theoretically, another such abstract, symbolic medium
of exchange between actors and institutions. The same deﬁnition as proferred above in
the economic setting makes sense in terms of these other media of exchange, these other
standards of value, for all the institutions of society, generalising the case of economic
institutions. This is the theory of ‘macro-sociology’.
Institutions in the other three functional subsectors of society are socially unjust if
they interfere with equal exchanges of the other generalised media of action for comparable
worth. This deﬁnition requires the construction of a value-theory for each of these media,
analgously to the construction, within economic theory, of a value-theory to explain the
reality underlying prices. Since Parsons worked within a Marshallian framework (of a
31theory of value and equilibrium) rather than a Post-Keynesian theory of value, this is
work which remains to be done.
Much work remains to be done, and it is to be hoped that economists continuing in
the tradition of Robinson and her school, sociologists, and moralists will be able to ﬁnd
a more fruitful framework for their common endeavours by using the deﬁnition of social
justice advanced here.
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